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James R. Brown. The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments
in the Natural Sciences. 2nd edition. x + 226 pp. London: Routledge,
2010.*
Michael T. Stuart
Originally published in 1991, The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought
Experiments in the Natural Sciences is the first monograph to identify and address
some of the many interesting questions that pertain to thought experiments.
While the putative aim of the book is to explore the nature of thought
experimental evidence, it has another important purpose which concerns the
crucial role thought experiments play in Brown’s Platonic master argument.
In that argument, Brown argues against naturalism and empiricism (Brown
2012), formathematical Platonism (Brown 2008), and from the Platonist-friendly,
abstract universals posited by the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong (DTA) account of
the laws of nature to a more general, physical Platonism. The Laboratory of the
Mind is where he takes this final step.
The main philosophical question that motivates Brown’s study is the
following: how do thought experiments reveal novel truths about the physical
world without the need for additional empirical input? As a response, Brown
develops a Platonic account of thought experiments that explains their epistemic
power by portraying some of them as (occasionally foggy) windows into the
Platonic world of forms. Brown’s account supplied so much grist for the
philosophical mill that it merited a second edition, which includes updated
arguments, two additional chapters, a new preface, and a rejuvenated aerword.
Brown first acquaints the reader with thought experiments by providing a
bevy of examples. These lay the foundation for his taxonomy, which groups
thought experiments based on function. The most important category is the
Platonic thought experiment, which “destroys” one theory while simultaneously
establishing another in a way that takes us beyond the setup or execution of
the thought experiment (p. 41). These special thought experiments work by
“establishing (in the imagination) the thought-experimental phenomenon” (p.
43, brackets in the original). It is the phenomenon that we mentally experience
which refutes some theory, and it is the same phenomenon that provides
* Received 10 November 2011.
 Mike is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Toronto. He would like to thank Yiach Fehige
and James R. Brown for their enduring support.
Spontaneous Generations 6:1 (2012) ISSN 1913-0465. University of Toronto.
Copyright 2012 by the HAPSAT Society. Some rights reserved. 237
M. Stuart REVIEW: Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind
evidence for a new theory by suggesting something about the laws of nature.
However, to appreciate the appeal of Brown’s position fully, we need to view it
in relation to that of his philosophical counterpart, John D. Norton.
Norton is convinced that thought experiments are epistemically no different
from arguments (Norton 1991; 1996; 2004a; 2004b). Since everyone accepts that
arguments are capable of producing new information from old, Norton claims
that we should adopt the “default” empiricist view that thought experiments
are merely arguments. As we’ve seen, one way Brown opposes this account
is by describing thought experiments as processes that produce phenomena,
and then trying to show that producing phenomena is not the same thing as
making a step-by-step propositional inference. To this end, Brown introduces
a new type of thought experiment he calls a counter thought experiment
(introduced in his new Chapter Three). These are thought experiments that
work by denying the phenomena of another thought experiment, which they
do by presenting contrasting phenomena of their own. Since they work on
phenomena, using phenomena, their function must be orthogonal to the parts
of a thought experiment that may be reconstructed as an argument. Since 2004,
Norton’s position has become more flexible, identifying thought experiments
not only as deductive and inductive, but informal arguments as well, which may
or may not be identifiable because of tacit premises or inferences. But as it still
limits thought experiments to manipulations of propositional content, Brown’s
account will appeal to any who see mental reasoning as non-propositional.
Aer discussing counter thought experiments, Brown introduces his
mathematical Platonism in Chapter Four. He anticipates the usual twofold
response from empiricists: Platonism does not respect the causal theory of
knowledge, and it proposes no theory of its own to explain how Platonic
perception works or when it goes wrong. To the first, Brown presents several
convincing counterarguments to the causal theory of knowledge. Further,
he claims that quantum mechanics allows for knowledge that cannot (even
possibly) be tied to physical measurement or observation.1 Brown concedes that
the second objection is serious, but argues that our ability to perceive abstract
truths is no more mysterious than our apparently innocuous ability to arrive at
abstract entities (thoughts, beliefs, etc.) from sensory input.
Given mathematical Platonism, Brown begins to argue for physical
Platonism. There are two non-mutually exclusive ways to view Brown’s
argument here: (1)Analogical: in the sameway that mathematical picture proofs
allow us to “see” mathematical objects and relations, thought experiments allow
us to “see” the laws of nature (p. 98); and (2) Inference to the best explanation:
to explain successful thought-experimenting in science, we must posit Platonic
1 For more on this, the reader should refer to Brown’s Platonic interpretation of quantum
mechanics given in Chapter Eight.
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access to the laws of nature (p. 124). Both of these strategies are in “harmony”
(p. 107) with “the best account of laws of nature” (p. 72), the DTA account.
This account portrays laws as necessary relations among abstract universals.
Assuming harmony with Brown’s Platonism, we should ask: is this really the
best account of laws of nature? Perhaps not. Since 1991, the DTA account
has lost quite a bit of ground to other realist accounts, including dispositional
essentialism and property and structural realism. These accounts ground events
and objects in more fundamental metaphysical entities like categories, essences,
structures, properties, etc.2 The question becomes: could these accounts be
adopted in support of Platonism? Someone like Brown could certainly argue
that we have Platonic access to the dispositions, properties, structures, or
essences that these accounts postulate. This is especially obvious in the case
of structural realism, a position which sometimes advances abstract universals
and emphasizes the metaphysical priority of relations (see Stein 1989, 59).
But even if we allow for the possibility of Platonic perception and the
existence of universals, there remain some interesting questions. While Brown
claims that we see the laws of nature using thought experiments, what he really
wants to say is that we see the universals that figure into those relations (p.
98, 107). I wonder if the necessary relations into which the universals figure
are entailed by the universals themselves. If so, this works quite nicely with
Peacocke’s (2000) and BonJour’s (1998) views of the a priori. If they are not
entailed, do we learn about them empirically, Platonically, or both? Since we can
grasp mathematical objects, and there is no empirical way to find the relations
between them, we must also be able to grasp the relations Platonically as well.
So if Brown’s analogy holds, we should be able to grasp the relations between
physically instantiated universals in the same way. Brown cites experiment as
a separate path to knowledge of the relations between universals. Are these
two paths always open, and which has priority when they conflict? The same
questions arise with respect to the entailment between a law of nature and
its corresponding physical regularity: is this entailment deductive, perceived,
observed, or some combination of all three?
There is another issue concerning Platonic thought experiments and laws
of nature, which is related to the possibility of a unified account of thought
experiments. Rachel Cooper (2005) argues that we should strive for an account
of thought experiments that ranges over all fields of inquiry, not just science.
If there are Platonic thought experiments in fields outside of physics and
mathematics, those fields must have their own laws of nature for the Platonic
2 See, e.g., A. Chakravary, A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); B. Ellis, The Metaphysics of Scientific
Realism, (Acumen: Durham, 2009); S. French, The Interdependence of Structure, Objects and
Dependence, Synthese 175(1) (2010): 89-109; and A. Bokulich and P. Bokulich, eds., Scientific
Structuralism, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010).
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thought experiments to see. Brown hints early on (p. 31) that the lack of
thought experiments in chemistry might be due to the absence of laws in that
discipline. If chemical laws are reducible to physical laws, it seems natural that
there should be no Platonic thought experiments in chemistry. But what about
philosophy? Philosophy is full of thought experiments meant to disprove one
theory and simultaneously establish another. By Brown’s logic, this should
imply that there are necessarily related abstract universals in the domains of
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc., to which these thought experiments give
access. Brownmay be happy to admit laws of metaphysics and personal identity
and so on, since when it comes to abstract entities, the Platonist’s moo is “the
more the merrier.” However, admiing laws here might make a Platonic account
of laws less appealing to those already on the fence.
In the remainder of the book, Brown applies his theory to scientific
episodes and actors from the pre-Socratics to quantum mechanics. One episode
features Einstein, who is justifiably known as one of the most important
thought experimenters since Galileo. An issue here concerns the standard
interpretation of Einstein as an ageing verificationist, who nonetheless employed
unverifiable thought experiments. This would make him methodologically
inconsistent. Brown provides a reconstruction of Einstein’s meta-philosophical
stance on the relation of theory to evidence which harmonizes Einstein’s use of
thought experiments with his other writings. Yet, it is interesting to note that
Einstein expressed vehement distaste for even the use of the phrase “thought
experiment” when applied to his arguments (see Kühne 2005, 227-29). This
suggests that more work needs to be done to square Brown’s account of Einstein
with Einstein’s own, perhaps misdirected remarks (but see Ierodiakonou and
Roux 2011, 1-27).
Whether you will be romanced by Platonism or not, this book is invaluable
reading for anyone with overlapping interests in the history and philosophy of
science, or the traditional debates of metaphysics and epistemology. Empiricists
will find a stimulating opponent, rationalists will find ammunition for their
cause, and all will appreciate the clear prose and lasting philosophical issues
with which Brown has almost single-handedly fathered the growing subfield
that now studies thought experiments.
M T. S
IHPST, University of Toronto
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